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NOTES

Terror, Tort, and the First
Amendment
HATFILL V. NEW YORK TIMES AND MEDIA
LIABILITY FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
“Someone must have been telling lies about Joseph K., for without
having done anything wrong he was arrested one fine morning.” 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

On the morning of August 6, 2002, CBS’s “The Early
Show” and NBC’s “Today” broadcast a statement read by
Attorney General John Ashcroft naming Dr. Steven Jay Hatfill
a “person of interest” to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in their
investigation into the 2001 anthrax attacks. 2 While Dr. Hatfill
was never arrested in connection with the “Amerithrax”
investigation, the accusations against him nevertheless
The federal government
drastically impacted his life. 3
repeatedly interrogated, monitored, and searched Dr. Hatfill,
the press made him the subject of numerous news stories, and
the DOJ caused him to lose a lucrative and prominent position
in the bio-defense field. 4 In a public statement on August 25,
1

FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 1 (Willa Muir et al. trans., Schocken Books 1995)

(1937).
2

Hatfill v. Ashcroft, 404 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 (D.D.C. 2005).
Scott Shane, In 4-Year Anthrax Hunt, F.B.I. Finds Itself Stymied, and
Sued, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005, at A1. The investigation into the 2001 anthrax
attacks was named “Amerithrax” by the FBI.
Amerithrax Links Page,
http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithraxlinks.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2006).
4
Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer (CNN television broadcast Aug. 25, 2002),
transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0208/25/le.00.html.
Before the accusations, Dr. Hatfill held a position at Louisiana State University paying
3
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2002, Dr. Hatfill expressed his considerable frustration: “My
life is being destroyed by arrogant government bureaucrats
who are peddling groundless innuendo and half information
about me to gullible reporters who, in turn, repeat
this . . . under the guise of news.” 5 One reporter in particular
drew Dr. Hatfill’s wrath—Nicholas D. Kristof of the New York
Times (“Times”). 6 Kristof wrote a series of columns spanning
from May to August 2002, harshly criticizing the FBI for,
among other things, not thoroughly investigating Dr. Hatfill,
whom he named “Mr. Z.” 7 Dr. Hatfill blamed Kristof and his
allegedly irresponsible reporting in large part for his ordeal,
which he likened in its absurdity to that of “Joseph K.” in
Kafka’s The Trial. 8 Dr. Hatfill wholeheartedly maintained his
innocence throughout and eventually turned to the courts to
vindicate his name, filing two lawsuits—one against Kristof
and the Times claiming defamation and intentional infliction of
emotional distress (“IIED”), 9 and another against John
Ashcroft, the FBI, and the DOJ claiming violations of his rights
under the First and Fifth Amendments and the Privacy Act. 10
This Note focuses on the first suit, specifically the claim of
IIED, the dismissal of that claim by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 11 its reinstatement
$150,000 per year. The Justice Department, however, funded this position and they,
apparently, were reticent to continue lining the pockets of their “person of interest.”
See Marilyn W. Thompson, The Persuit [sic] of Steven Hatfill, WASH. POST, Sept. 14,
2003, at W6.
5
Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, supra note 4.
6
Id. (“Why is it necessary, right or fair, Mr. Kristoff [sic], for you to write
these things?”).
7
Nicholas D. Kristof, Connecting Deadly Dots, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2002, at
A25 [hereinafter Kristof, Connecting Deadly Dots]; Nicholas D. Kristof, Anthrax? The
F.B.I. Yawns, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at A21 [hereinafter Kristof, The FBI Yawns];
Nicholas D. Kristof, The Anthrax Files, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2002, at A19 [hereinafter
Kristof, The Anthrax Files I]; Nicholas D. Kristof, Case of the Missing Anthrax, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2002, at A17 [hereinafter Kristof, Case of the Missing Anthrax];
Nicholas D. Kristof, The Anthrax Files, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at A19 [hereinafter
Kristof, The Anthrax Files II].
8
Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, supra note 4. Dr. Hatfill even sarcastically
suggested that The Trial was Kristof’s inspiration for dubbing him “Mr. Z.” Id.
9
Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1129 (E.D. Va.
2004), rev’d, 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1619 (2006).
10
Hatfill v. Ashcroft, 404 F. Supp. 2d 104, 106 (D.D.C. 2005). Hatfill also
sued Vassar professor and handwriting expert Donald Foster because of an article
written by Foster in Vanity Fair expressing the conclusion, based largely on his
analysis of the handwriting on the anthrax letters, that the FBI should focus its
investigation on Hatfill. See generally Hatfill v. Foster, 372 F. Supp. 2d 725 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
11
Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1129.
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and denial of rehearing by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, 12 and the implications presented by
allowing such claims to proceed against the press pursuant to
their coverage of the paramount issues of the day.
After developing the factual landscape that gave rise to
the Times lawsuit in Part II, Part III discusses the procedural
history of Hatfill v. New York Times. Part IV briefly surveys
the development of the tort of IIED before focusing on the tort’s
application against media defendants, paying special attention
to the First Amendment problems that arise when plaintiffs
use the tort to punish speech on matters of legitimate public
concern. Part V maintains that these problems require courts
to adopt a newsworthiness defense to IIED, applicable at the
pleading stage, which would account for tort law’s remedial
objectives in compensating emotional damages while ensuring
that the press will be free to responsibly report on public issues
without fear of reprisal. This Note concludes by demonstrating
that the application of such a defense in Hatfill would have
required the Fourth Circuit to affirm the district court’s
dismissal.
II.

FACTS

A.

The Anthrax Attacks

In late 2001, while the nation was still reeling from the
terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington D.C., a
subtle but insidious threat revealed itself in South Florida. On
October 4, the public learned that a photo editor named Robert
Stevens lay dying in a West Palm Beach hospital from acute
inhalational anthrax disease, caused by exposure to anthrax,
one of the world’s deadliest known pathogens. 13 Mr. Stevens
died the following day, and within two days, his friend and coworker Ernesto Blanco—a mailroom employee at the Boca

12
Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 1619 (2006).
13
Laurie Garrett, Questions Linger; Unknown Dominates Probe a Year After
Deadly Anthrax Mailings, NEWSDAY, Oct. 7, 2002, at A7 [hereinafter Garrett,
Questions Linger].
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Raton headquarters of American Media, Inc. 14 —fell ill from the
same anthrax-induced affliction. 15
In the weeks that followed, a series of anthrax-laden
letters surfaced in several conspicuous places in a manner
clearly geared to garner public attention. The first such letter,
addressed to broadcaster Tom Brokaw, was discovered in the
office of his assistant at the Manhattan headquarters of NBC
News. 16 Shortly thereafter, two more contaminated envelopes
appeared, one addressed to the “Editor” of the New York Post,
and then on October 15, another addressed to Senator Tom
Following the
Daschle at his Washington D.C. office. 17
discovery of the Daschle letter, the FBI placed a large quantity
of mail from Capitol Hill in quarantine. 18 Amongst this
sequestered mail, agents discovered another letter teeming
with anthrax spores and addressed to Senator Patrick Leahy
on November 16, 2001. 19
14

American Media, Inc. publishes the National Enquirer. Thompson, supra

note 4.
15
Id. The source of the anthrax that killed Mr. Stevens and sickened Mr.
Blanco was never determined, although Mr. Stevens’ office mail slot and computer
keyboard later tested positive for contamination. Id.; Garrett, Questions Linger, supra
note 13.
16
Laurie Garrett, The Anthrax Crisis; How a Suspected Case in NYC
Threaded Its Way to Diagnosis Despite Initial CDC Uncertainty, NEWSDAY, Oct. 8,
2002, at A37 [hereinafter Garrett, The Anthrax Crisis]. As the events in Florida
unfolded, Tom Brokaw’s assistant, Erin O’Connor became certain that she had been
exposed to anthrax. She recalled opening an envelope addressed to Mr. Brokaw on
September 25 and noticing a white powder within. Several days later, she developed a
painless, but unsightly sore on her collarbone. Initial testing of the suspected envelope
and Ms. O’Connor’s skin tissue was negative, but a Center for Disease Control (CDC)
lab in Atlanta eventually concluded that her sore was the result of anthrax exposure.
On October 12, New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani informed the city and nation of
the CDC’s determination. Later that day, another envelope addressed to Mr. Brokaw
was discovered in Ms. O’Connor’s desk and was delivered to a city health department
lab by the NYPD where it not only tested positive for anthrax, but contaminated the
entire lab, causing the lab to be sealed shut for months following the incident. Id.
17
Shane, supra note 3; Susan Schmidt, Only One Barrel of Congress Mail
Tainted; Officials Say Batch Included Letter to Leahy, Now Under Analysis for
Anthrax, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2001, at A6. See also Press Release, FBI, Photos of
Anthrax Letters to NBC, Senator Daschle, and NY Post (Oct. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel01/102301.htm.
18
Schmidt, supra note 17.
19
Id.; Opening of the Letter: An Interview with Van A. Harp, Asst. Dir. of the
Washington field office, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/vanharp/transcript.htm (last
visited Oct. 4, 2005) [hereinafter An Interview with Van A. Harp]. The letters to NBC
and the New York Post were postmarked September 18, while the letters to the two
Senators were postmarked October 9 and their return address indicated they were
mailed by a fourth grader from a fictitious “Greendale School” in Franklin Park, New
Jersey. Thompson, supra note 4; Schmidt, supra note 17; Press Release, supra note 17.
The letter to Senator Daschle was dated “9-11-01” and contained a message scrawled in
childish handwriting:
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All four letters bore postmarks from Trenton, New
Jersey. 20 Before arriving at Capitol Hill, the letters addressed
to the two Senators passed through the massive Brentwood
postal distribution center in Northeast D.C. and, as a result,
caused the deaths of two postal workers there—Joseph
Curseen and Thomas Morris Jr. 21 By the time the threat
subsided, the anthrax attacks claimed the lives of five people
and sickened seventeen others. 22 Evidence of anthrax spores
surfaced not only in New York, New Jersey, Washington D.C.,
and Florida, but also in places as seemingly far removed from
the attacks as Kansas City, Missouri, and the United States
Embassy in Vilnius, Lithuania. 23
B.

The FBI’s Investigation, Nicholas Kristof’s Articles, and
Dr. Steven Hatfill’s “Emergence” as a Person of Interest

Before the struggle in Florida for Robert Stevens’ life
had ended, the FBI’s investigation into the source of his
affliction had begun. 24 After discovering the letters in New
YOU CAN NOT STOP US.
WE HAVE THIS ANTHRAX.
YOU DIE NOW.
ARE YOU AFRAID?
DEATH TO AMERICA.
DEATH TO ISRAEL.
ALLAH IS GREAT.
Press Release, supra note 17. Senator Leahy’s letter contained a nearly identical
message.
Opening of the Letter, Amerithrax: Seeking Information, FBI,
http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/vanharp/introleahy.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2006). While
the envelopes addressed to Mr. Brokaw and the New York Post were without a return
address, the letters within were also dated “9-11-01” and their message, in the same
handwriting, was similar:
THIS IS NEXT
TAKE PENACILIN [sic] NOW
DEATH TO AMERICA
DEATH TO ISRAEL
ALLAH IS GREAT
Press Release, supra note 17.
20
Schmidt, supra note 4.
21
Thompson, supra note 4.
22
Shane, supra note 3. The deaths of an elderly Connecticut woman, Ottilie
Lundgren, and a hospital worker from the Bronx, Kathy Nguyen, were also determined
to have been caused by anthrax exposure, but how they came into contact with the
pathogen remains a mystery. Garrett, The Anthrax Crisis, supra note 16.
23
Thompson, supra note 4.
24
Before he died, samples of Mr. Stevens’ blood were taken to a laboratory at
Northern Arizona University in Flagstaff to be analyzed by Paul Keim, a specialist in
bacterial evolution and caretaker of a collection of genetic variants of anthrax. Keim’s
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York, the FBI revealed that a variant of anthrax known as the
“Ames” strain was being used in the attacks. 25 Although it was
initially unclear where the Ames strain originated, 26 the FBI
knew that it resembled a strain of anthrax commonly used in
American bio-defense research and held at several military
facilities, including the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute
for Infectious Diseases (“USAMRIID”) at Fort Detrick,
Maryland. 27
The USAMRIID facility quickly became an important
base of operations in the FBI’s investigation, dubbed
“Amerithrax.” 28 USAMRIID had long been a leader in the
study of deadly biological agents; both defensively, in creating
vaccines and treatments and also prior to 1969, offensively, in
engineering military uses for them. 29 Due to this amassed
expertise, the FBI naturally turned to the facility to aid in its
investigation and brought the letters addressed to Senators
Daschle and Leahy there to be studied. 30 As the Fort Detrick
scientists opened and examined these letters, it became
apparent that the anthrax mailer had used sophisticated
methods to weaponize his anthrax and make it optimal for
inhalation. 31
Based in part on these findings, the FBI offered a
tentative outline of some of the characteristics they believed

lab studied the Stevens sample, quickly identified it as the “Ames” strand and relayed
the information to the FBI. Debora MacKenzie, The Insider, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 9,
2002, at 88 [hereinafter MacKenzie, The Insider].
25
Id.
26
Id. In an earlier article, MacKenzie had opined that the Ames strand
identified by Keim and the FBI referred to a variant of anthrax developed under a
USAMRIID weapons program that was terminated in 1969. Debora MacKenzie, Trail
of Terror, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 27, 2001, at 44. The Department of Agriculture later
identified the Ames strand as being isolated from a Texas cow in 1981. It was named
Ames after a veterinary lab in Ames, Iowa that was on the return address of the
envelopes that were used to post the sample to army scientists. MacKenzie, The
Insider, supra note 24.
27
Shane, supra note 3; MacKenzie, The Insider, supra note 24.
28
See Shane, supra note 3. See also Martin Enserink, On Biowarfare’s
Frontline: Heightened Fears of Bioterrorism Have Shone the Spotlight on the Army’s
Biodefense Lab—and Pulled its Researchers out of Their Isolation, SCIENCE, June 14,
2002, at 1954.
29
Enserink, supra note 28.
30
See id.
31
MacKenzie, The Insider, supra note 24; An Interview with Van A. Harp,
supra note 19. The anthrax particles in the letter were of a uniform size, highly
concentrated with no debris, coated to prevent clumping and had been treated with an
unusual form of silica to facilitate the drying process. MacKenzie, The Insider, supra
note 24.

2006]

TERROR, TORT, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

243

the suspect possessed in a January 29, 2002 letter to the
Members of the American Society for Microbiology:
[A] single person is most likely responsible for these
mailings. . . . Based on his or her selection of the Ames strain of
Bacillus anthracis one would expect that this individual has or had
legitimate access to select biological agents at some time. This
person has the technical knowledge and/or expertise to produce a
highly refined and deadly product. 32

Because of USAMRIID’s expertise, history and inventory of
Ames anthrax, some of its scientists clearly had the access and
technical knowledge described in the FBI’s profile. 33 These
scientists seemed all the more suspicious because of Fort
Detrick’s allegedly questionable security, specifically its
reported loss of anthrax, ebola, and other pathogen samples
during the early 1990’s. 34 Thus, it was not surprising that the
lab and its researchers, in addition to being a vital tool in the
Amerithrax investigation, quickly became its prominent
focus. 35
It was this attention on Fort Detrick that first led
investigators to Dr. Hatfill. Dr. Hatfill worked at USAMRIID
from 1997 to 1999 on a fellowship studying Ebola and related
viruses. 36 Prior to that, he spent a good portion of his adult life
in Africa pursuing various degrees and affiliating himself with
the militaries of several countries. 37 After his fellowship at
USAMRIID expired, Hatfill landed a job at Science
Applications International Corporation (“SAIC”), a huge
government contractor that works closely with the CIA and
other government agencies. 38 In the summer of 2001, while
working at SAIC, Hatfill applied for a heightened security
clearance to work with the CIA, which required him to pass a

32
Letter from Van Harp, Asst. Dir. Washington Field Office, FBI, to
Members of the American Society for Microbiology (Jan. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.fas.org/bwc/news/anthraxreport.htm.
33
See Enserink, supra note 29.
34
Id.
35
Id. The only other government lab that received comparable attention to
USAMRIID at the early stages of the investigation was the Army’s Dugway Proving
Ground in Utah, which was revealed to have secretly weaponized anthrax after the
USAMRIID program was stopped by President Nixon in 1969. Id.; MacKenzie, supra
note 24.
36
David Tell, The Hunting of Steven J. Hatfill, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 16,
2002, at 21.
37
Thompson, supra note 4.
38
Id.
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polygraph. 39 Reportedly, the results of this polygraph were less
than satisfactory and the CIA denied Hatfill’s application for
upgraded clearance in August 2001. 40 Shortly thereafter, the
Department of Defense revoked his regular security
clearance. 41 Rightly or wrongly, Hatfill’s eccentric past, his
connections to Fort Detrick, and the perception that he might
be angry at the government over his security clearance placed
him in the unenviable position of being on the FBI’s short list
of possible suspects. 42
In the beginning of 2002, Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a
college professor and bio-defense expert, became frustrated at
the pace of the FBI’s investigation and began collecting
available evidence and posting her detailed analysis of it
online. 43 After earlier posting her belief that the anthrax killer
was likely a USAMRIID scientist, she wrote on February 5,
2002, that “[f]or more than three months now the FBI has
known that the perpetrator of the anthrax attacks is American.
This conclusion must have been based on the perpetrator’s
evident connection to the US biodefense program.” 44 On
February 25, 2002, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer
addressed Ms. Rosenberg’s allegations in a press briefing when
a reporter asked if there had been a suspect for three months
and if it was an American scientist from Fort Detrick. After
explaining that the FBI was still investigating several possible
suspects, Mr. Fleischer responded, “[a]ll indications are that
the source of the anthrax is domestic . . . [a]nd I just can’t go
beyond that.” 45
On May 24, 2002, writing in his regular column on the
Times’ editorial page, Nicholas Kristof did go beyond Mr.
39

Id.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Thompson, supra note 4. Ms. Rosenberg is a professor of biology and
environmental studies at the State University of New York (SUNY) at Purchase and
affiliated with the Federation of American Scientists. Id.; SUNY at Purchase
Environmental Studies Faculty, http://www.ns.purchase.edu/envsci/faculty.htm.
44
Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Federation of American Scientists, Analysis of
Anthrax Attacks, Commentary: Is the FBI Dragging its Feet? (Feb. 5, 2002), available
at http://www.fas.org/bwc/news/anthraxreport.htm. Ms. Rosenberg went on to analyze
how characteristics of the initial anthrax letters and subsequent hoax letters allowed
for “a more refined estimate of the perpetrator’s motives. He must be angry at some
biodefense agency or component, and he is driven to demonstrate, in a spectacular way,
his capabilities and the government’s inability to respond.” Id.
45
Press Briefing, Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secretary (Feb. 25, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020225-16.html#12.
40
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Fleischer’s description. With the stated goal of “light[ing] a fire
under the F.B.I. in its investigation of the anthrax case,”
Kristof wrote:
Experts in the bioterror field are already buzzing about a handful of
individuals who had the ability, access and motive to send the
anthrax. These experts point, for example, to one middle-aged
American who has worked for the United States military bio-defense
program and had access to the labs at Fort Detrick, Md. His anthrax
vaccinations are up to date, he unquestionably had the ability to
make first-rate anthrax, and he was upset at the United States
government in the period preceding the anthrax attacks. 46

One month later, on June 24, 2002, Barbara Rosenberg and
several FBI officials attended a closed meeting before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, which was then chaired by
anthrax letter recipient Senator Patrick Leahy. 47 The following
day, federal agents sought and received permission from Dr.
Hatfill to conduct the first of several searches of his Frederick,
Maryland apartment. 48
Shortly thereafter on July 2, 2002, the Times published
another of Kristof’s columns criticizing the FBI’s investigation
and calling attention to the national security threats posed by
the bureau’s “lackadaisical ineptitude in pursuing the anthrax
killer.” 49 The column read:
Almost everyone who has encountered the F.B.I. anthrax
investigation is aghast at the bureau’s lethargy. Some in the
biodefense community think they know a likely culprit, whom I’ll
call Mr. Z. Although the bureau has polygraphed Mr. Z, searched his
home twice and interviewed him four times, it has not placed him
under surveillance or asked its outside handwriting expert to
compare his writing to that on the anthrax letters. . . . He denies any
wrongdoing, and his friends are heartsick at suspicions directed
against a man they regard as a patriot. Some of his polygraphs show
evasion, I hear, although that may be because of his temperament.
If Mr. Z were an Arab national, he would have been imprisoned long
ago. But he is a true-blue American with close ties to the U.S.
Defense Department, the C.I.A. and the American biodefense
program. On the other hand, he was once caught with a girlfriend in
a biohazard “hot suite” at Fort Detrick, surrounded only by blushing
germs. . . . [I]t’s time for the F.B.I. to make a move: either it should

46
47
48
49

Kristof, Connecting Deadly Dots, supra note 7.
Thompson, supra note 4.
Id.
Kristof, The F.B.I. Yawns, supra note 7.
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go after him more aggressively . . . or it should seek to exculpate him
and remove this cloud of suspicion. 50

Kristof then went on to pose a series of questions to the FBI:
Do you know how many identities and passports Mr. Z has and are
you monitoring his international travel? . . . Why was his top
security clearance suspended . . . less than a month before the
anthrax attacks began? . . . Have you searched the isolated residence
that he had access to last fall? The F.B.I. . . . knows that Mr. Z gave
Cipro to people who visited it. . . . Have you examined whether Mr. Z
has connections to the biggest anthrax outbreak among humans ever
recorded . . . in Zimbabwe in 1978-90? There is evidence that the
anthrax was released by the white Rhodesian Army . . . Mr. Z has
claimed that he participated in the white army’s much feared Selous
Scouts. . . . Mr. Z’s resume also claims involvement in the former
South African Defense Force; all else aside, who knew that the U.S.
Defense Department would pick an American who had served in the
armed forces of two white-racist regimes to work . . . with some of
the world’s deadliest germs? 51

Kristof’s next column appeared on July 12 and it
discussed the possibility that earlier anthrax hoaxes in 1997
and 1999 may have been connected to the 2001 attacks. 52
Much of the column criticized the FBI’s failure to look to these
earlier incidents to aid in their current investigation. 53
However, Kristof did mention Mr. Z again, this time in
connection with a 1997 anthrax scare in Washington D.C. 54
Kristof noted that the incident occurred on the same day as a
terrorism seminar held in the D.C. area. According to Kristof,
“Mr. Z seemed peeved that neither he nor any other bio-defense
expert had been included as a speaker.” 55 Kristof quoted a
letter that Dr. Hatfill apparently sent to the organizer of the
seminar in which he wrote that he was “rather concerned” at
the omission. 56 Without mentioning specifics, Kristof also
wrote that Dr. Hatfill subsequently used the 1997 incident “to
underscore the importance of his field and his own status
within it,” and to demonstrate how future attacks might
occur. 57

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id.
Id.
Kristof, The Anthrax Files I, supra note 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The column also explained that the 1997 hoax involved
a fake anthrax gelatin, while a series of letters sent to a
combination of media and government targets in 1999 had used
fake anthrax powder. 58 Kristof found this interesting because
“Mr. Z apparently learned about powders during those two
years. His 1999 resume adds something missing from the 1997
version: ‘working knowledge of wet and dry BW [biological
The column concluded by again
warfare] agents . . . .’” 59
chastising the FBI for failing to properly investigate these
earlier incidents for links to the 2001 attacks. 60
The Times published Kristof’s next column dealing with
the anthrax attacks one week later on July 19, but it was
primarily limited to discussing the reported security breaches
at the USAMRIID labs at Fort Detrick. Mr. Z was mentioned
in passing, but only to explain “what piqued [Kristof’s] interest
in U[SAMRIID] in the first place.” 61 Kristof did not write of
Mr. Z again until after the Attorney General identified Dr.
Hatfill as a “person of interest” on August 6, 2002 and Dr.
Hatfill himself held a press conference disavowing his guilt on
August 11. 62 On August 13, 2002, when Kristof next wrote
about the anthrax attacks, he focused exclusively on Dr.
Hatfill. 63
Kristof began the August 13 column by “com[ing] clean
on ‘Mr. Z’” and identifying him as Dr. Hatfill, but urging his
readers to maintain a presumption of innocence because “[i]t
must be a genuine assumption that he is an innocent man
caught in a nightmare.
There is not a shred of
traditional . . . evidence linking him to the attacks.” 64 Much of
the rest of the column reiterated the circumstantial evidence
already compiled, however, Kristof did add several new bits of
information.
Among this was the only physical evidence
against Hatfill—Kristof reported that specially trained
bloodhounds, which had been given scent packets taken from
the anthrax letters “responded strongly to Dr. Hatfill, to his
apartment, to his girlfriend’s apartment and even to his former
58

Kristof, The Anthrax Files I, supra note 7.
Id.
60
Id.
61
Kristof, Case of the Missing Anthrax, supra note 7.
62
For the text of Hatfill’s initial press conferences see Text of Hatfill’s
Statement (Aug. 11, 2002), http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,
60124,00.html.
63
Kristof, The Anthrax Files II, supra note 7.
64
Id.
59
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girlfriend’s apartment, as well as to restaurants that he had
recently entered . . . . The dogs did not respond to other people,
apartments or restaurants.” 65
Kristof went on to question why it took the FBI so long
to bring in the bloodhounds, or to read Hatfill’s unpublished
novel, “Emergence,” which depicts a biological attack on
Congress. 66 Kristof also called attention to several apparently
false claims on Hatfill’s resume, namely, “a Ph.D. degree, work
with the U.S. Special Forces [and] membership in Britain’s
The column concluded by
Royal Society of Medicine.” 67
crediting the FBI for “pick[ing] up its pace” and noting that
“[p]eople very close to Dr. Hatfill are now cooperating with the
authorities, information has been presented to a grand jury,
and there is reason to hope that the bureau may soon be able to
end this unseemly limbo by either exculpating Dr. Hatfill or
arresting him.” 68 Despite Kristof’s optimistic prediction, the
Amerithrax investigation remains unsolved and the FBI has
yet to arrest Dr. Hatfill or anyone else in connection with it. 69
III.

HISTORY OF HATFILL V. NEW YORK TIMES

On June 18, 2003, shortly before the statute of
limitations was to run with respect to Kristof’s July 2002
columns, Dr. Hatfill filed a complaint in Virginia state court
against Kristof and the Times claiming that the four columns
from July and August 2002 defamed him. Taking advantage of
Virginia’s tolling statute, Dr. Hatfill preserved the viability of
his claims but never proceeded with his state action, instead
He then
taking a voluntary non-suit in March 2004. 70
commenced an action in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia on July 13, 2004. 71
65
Id. The bloodhounds apparently made a positive identification of Dr.
Hatfill’s scent after smelling the decontaminated anthrax letters. Dr. Hatfill explained
that the only identification was a friendly reaction that one dog had when Dr. Hatfill
reached down to pet him. Thompson, supra note 4.
66
Kristof, The Anthrax Files II, supra note 7. For a more detailed discussion
of Dr. Hatfill’s novel, see Ted Bridis, Hatfill Novel Depicts Terror Attack, ASSOCIATED
PRESS,
Aug.
14,
2002,
available
at
http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/
hatfillnovelterror.html.
67
Kristof, The Anthrax Files II, supra note 7.
68
Id.
69
See Editorial, The Anthrax Metaphor, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2005, at A24.
70
Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1129, 1132 (E.D.
Va. 2004), rev’d, 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1619 (2006).
71
Id.
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Dismissal by the District Court

Dr. Hatfill’s federal complaint purported to state three
causes of action against both Kristof individually and the
Times. Count I claimed that Kristof’s five columns, taken as a
whole, stated or implied that Dr. Hatfill was responsible for the
anthrax mailings, thereby falsely imputing to him homicidal
conduct, and that Kristof and the Times intended the columns
to convey this message. 72 Count II asserted an independent
claim of libel based on a number of “discrete untruths”
purportedly contained in Kristof’s columns. 73 Count III of the
complaint claimed IIED. 74 After being served, Kristof and the
Times moved the court, pursuant to Rule 12(b), to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, and as to Kristof, because the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over him. 75 As to Count I, the court framed the
issue before it as:
[W]hether the challenged columns reasonably can be read to accuse
Hatfill of actually being the anthrax mailer, based upon
consideration of the full content of the columns and upon the context
in which they were published, i.e., as a series of opinion pieces
appearing on the Op-Ed page of a national newspaper. 76

Despite the fact that Kristof’s columns raised a number of
questions about Dr. Hatfill and accurately described him “as
the overwhelming focus of the [FBI’s] investigation,” the court
failed to find that they endorsed a belief in his guilt. 77 Nor did
it find that a reasonable reader would have viewed the columns
as intending to defame Dr. Hatfill. 78 “Because the columns
specifically and repeatedly disavow[ed] any conclusion of guilt,”
the court rejected Dr. Hatfill’s contention that they were
written in such a manner as to impute his responsibility for the

72

Id.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1130. Kristof argued that he had insufficient contacts with the state
of Virginia to allow a court sitting in that state to exercise jurisdiction over him
without violating his constitutional right of due process. Id. at 1137-38.
76
Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1133.
77
Id. at 1134.
78
Id. (citing White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 519 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (citations omitted)). The court required a finding of such intent because
innuendo, rather than a direct accusation, supported the claim of defamation. Id.
(citing Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1110 (4th Cir. 1993)).
73
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anthrax mailings in the minds of reasonable readers. 79 Based
on these findings, the court dismissed Count I of the
complaint. 80
Having found that Kristof’s columns collectively failed
to be capable of defamatory meaning, the district court had
little difficulty in ruling that each of the several “discrete
untruths” alleged by Dr. Hatfill independently failed to convey
such meaning. 81 Since even according to the complaint, the
allegedly false statements “simply reinforce[d] the purported
inference that Hatfill is the anthrax mailer,” the court
dismissed Count II, ruling as a matter of law that such
statements could not independently support a separate claim
for libel. 82
The court began its analysis of Count III by noting that
Virginia law considered IIED to be a traditionally disfavored
claim. 83 Although the court did not elaborate on why this was
so, it cited to Barret v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., which
explains that Virginia courts disfavor IIED and similar torts
because of their speculative nature and tendency to presume
harm. 84 The court continued by explaining that in order to
state a claim for IIED under Virginia law, a plaintiff must both
plead and prove by clear and convincing evidence four distinct
elements: (1) that the defendant acted intentionally or
recklessly; (2) that the conduct complained of was outrageous
and intolerable; (3) that such conduct caused plaintiff
emotional distress; and (4) that the emotional distress suffered

79

Id. at 1134-35.
Id.
81
Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. at 1135-36. The allegedly false statements in
question were that Hatfill had the “ability to access and motive to send the anthrax”;
that he had access to an “isolated residence” around the time of the attacks and “gave
Cipro . . . to people who visited the [residence]”; that he had “up to date” anthrax
vaccinations; that he “failed 3 successive polygraph examinations”; that he was “upset
with the United States Government for a period preceding the anthrax attack”; and
that he “was once caught with a girlfriend in a biohazard ‘hot suite’ at Fort
Detrick . . . surrounded only by blushing germs.” Id. at 1136.
82
Id. As an additional ground for dismissing Count II, the court held that
the claim was barred by Virginia’s one year statute of limitations. Noting that the
second cause of action was not alleged in Dr. Hatfill’s original state court complaint,
the court determined that Dr. Hatfill was unable to take advantage of Virginia’s tolling
statute as to that claim, and was thus barred from bringing it in federal court after the
one year statute of limitations had run. Id. at 1135.
83
Id. at 1136 (citing Ruth v. Fletcher, 377 S.E.2d 412, 415 (Va. 1989); Barrett
v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 2001)).
84
240 F.3d at 269 (citing Ruth v. Fletcher, 377 S.E.2d 412, 415 (Va. 1989);
Bowles v. May, 166 S.E. 550, 555 (Va. 1932)). See also infra Part IV.
80
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was severe. 85 Finding that Dr. Hatfill’s pleading failed to prove
outrageous conduct and severity of harm, as well as that the
IIED claim was duplicative of the defamation claim, the court
dismissed Count III as well. 86
Hatfill’s complaint failed to satisfy the district court
regarding two of the four elements required to state a claim for
IIED. First, and most significantly, the court declined to find
that the defendants’ conduct was outrageous and intolerable. 87
Drawing on Virginia precedent, the court explained that for it
to make such a finding, the conduct in question must be “so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” 88
The court held that the publication of news or commentary on
important public matters, like the FBI’s investigation into the
anthrax attacks, simply could not constitute the type of
“outrageous and intolerable” conduct needed to support a claim
for IIED. 89 This conclusion finds support in a number of other
decisions, 90 despite the fact that IIED—unlike the overlapping

85
Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1136-37 (citing Russo v. White, 400
S.E.2d 160, 162 (Va. 1991); Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974)).
Virginia’s is a common articulation of the tort, mirroring the Restatement version
which provides: “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). See infra Part
IV.
86
Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1137.
87
Resolution of the “outrageousness” question is of such significance because
of its tendency to overshadow all other elements of the tort. Finding that a defendant
intentionally engaged in outrageous conduct will generally enable a reviewing court to
presume the state-of-mind, severity of distress, and causation elements of the tort.
Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 47-49 (1982). The Restatement itself suggests that “[s]evere
distress must be proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous character of
the defendant’s conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965). See infra Part IV.
88
Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1137 (quoting Russo, 400 S.E.2d at 162
(citation omitted)). This language is taken from a comment to the Restatement.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). See infra Part IV.
89
Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1137.
90
See Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress as a Cause of Action Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 491 (2000)
(surveying cases from the 1990’s where media defendants were sued for IIED and
noting that “[t]he tort . . . does not contain a newsworthiness or public interest defense,
but when considering such claims . . . some courts seemed to create one”). See also
infra Parts IV and V.
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public disclosure of private facts tort—does not contain an
inherent “newsworthiness” defense. 91
Additionally, the court found that Dr. Hatfill only made
“conclusory assertions” of suffering the requisite level of
emotional distress and thus failed to sufficiently plead the
fourth element of IIED. 92 When a defendant’s conduct is
sufficiently outrageous, courts tend to presume the requisite
degree of harm. 93 Given the district court’s failure to find the
columns in question “outrageous and intolerable,” it is not
surprising that it also failed to find that such columns caused
Dr. Hatfill severe emotional distress.
As the final ground for dismissing Count III, the court
found it duplicative of Dr. Hatfill’s defamation claim, and that
it amounted to an attempt to evade constitutional limits on
damage awards stemming from a single act of publication. 94
Noting that both Dr. Hatfill’s defamation and IIED claims were
“expressly and solely based on . . . publication of the [same]
series of columns,” the court found that the latter claim must
be dismissed. 95 Whether or not a claim for IIED may lie when
the underlying facts form the basis for another tort is a matter
in some dispute. A number of jurisdictions view IIED as a
“gap-filler” tort that is only available to redress wrongs not
covered by a traditional area of tort law. 96 Others take a
seemingly opposite view and only allow IIED claims to proceed
where the elements of another tort are satisfied, thus
91

See infra notes 203, 216.
Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1137.
93
Givelber, supra note 87, at 47-49.
94
Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1137 (“[A] separate action for [IIED]
which is premised solely on allegedly slanderous or libelous words themselves[] is not
only superfluous but impermissibly duplicative.” (quoting Smith v. Dameron, 12 Va.
Cir. 105, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1879, 1881 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1987))).
95
Id. (citing Smith, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1881). All three counts
against Kristof were additionally dismissed for want of personal jurisdiction. Id.
96
Lowe v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 2d 669, 675 (W.D. Tex. 2006)
(“I[IED] is a ‘gap-filler’ tort, allowing recovery in the rare instances in which a
defendant intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress in an unusual manner so the
victim has no other recognized theory of redress.” (citing Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v.
Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004))); Idema v. Wager, 120 F. Supp. 2d 361
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[A] cause of action for [IIED] should not be entertained where the
conduct complained of falls well within the ambit of other traditional tort liability.”
(quoting Sweeney v. Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of New York, 538 N.Y.S.2d 370, 374 (App.
Div. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Nix v. Cox Enters., Inc., 545 S.E.2d
319, 325 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (“Publication of allegedly false statements cannot give rise
to an action for [IIED], because the exclusive legal remedy where published works
cause injury remains an action for defamation.”), rev’d on other grounds, 560 S.E.2d
650 (Ga. 2002).
92
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essentially relegating IIED to a “parasitic” role as an element
Although Virginia law
of a traditional tort’s damages. 97
appears somewhat muddled on the issue, 98 once the court
dismissed Dr. Hatfill’s defamation claim, it could have
proceeded under either of the aforementioned theories in order
to dismiss the IIED claim. However, the court’s concern about
multiple damage awards suggests it viewed the “gap-filler”
approach as the more constitutionally sound. 99 Following his
resounding defeat in district court, Dr. Hatfill appealed all of
his claims against the Times to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 100
B.

Reinstatement by the Court of Appeals

Dr. Hatfill’s claims found a much more receptive
audience when they were brought before a three-judge panel of
the Fourth Circuit, a court notoriously unmoved by the familiar
First Amendment pleas of media defendants. 101 In an opinion
written by Judge Dennis Shedd 102 and issued on July 28, 2005,
the court reinstated all three of Dr. Hatfill’s claims against the
Times. 103
In its consideration of Count I, the court surveyed
Virginia defamation law and came to the conclusion that
97

Harris v. City of Seattle, 32 Media L. Rep. 1279 (W.D. Wash. 2003)
(Although IIED claims based on unsuccessful libel claims must be dismissed, it is
improper to dismiss an IIED claim where an actionable tort that accounts for mental
suffering, such as false light, survives the pleading stage. (citing Dworkin v. Hustler
Magazine, 867 F.2d 1188, 1193 n.2 (9th Cir. 1989)); Leidholdt v. L.F.P., Inc., 860 F.2d
890, 893 n.4 (9th Cir. 1988)); Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1125 n.4 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) (Where libel and false light claims fail to state a cause of action, the
underlying behavior likewise must fail to state a cause of action for IIED.).
98
Compare Smith, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1881 (“[A] separate action for
[IIED] which is based solely on allegedly slanderous or libelous words themselves,
is . . . impermissibly duplicative,” because it would allow a plaintiff to circumvent “the
strictures of modern defamation law.”), with Foretech v. Advance Magazine Publishers,
Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1099, 1104-05 (D.D.C. 1991) (applying Virginia law and holding that
although Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), alleviated some of Smith’s
concerns, an IIED claim cannot stand where a libel claim based on the same
statements fails “absent a specific factual showing that [a defendant] acted for the
specific purpose of inflicting emotional distress”).
99
See Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1136-37.
100
Being unable to establish personal jurisdiction, Hatfill voluntarily
dismissed all claims against Kristof individually. Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 416
F.3d 320, 329 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1619 (2006).
101
See, e.g., Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), rev’d, Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
102
Chief Judge William Wilkins joined in the opinion, and Judge Paul
Niemeyer dissented.
103
Hatfill, 416 F.3d 320.
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Kristof’s columns were capable of defamatory meaning in that
they imputed to Hatfill the commission of a “criminal offense
involving moral turpitude,” namely the murders of five people,
for which, if true, Dr. Hatfill could be indicted and punished. 104
Notwithstanding Kristof’s cursory, but oft-repeated statements
urging his readers to maintain a presumption of innocence as
to Dr. Hatfill, the court found that “the unmistakable theme of
Kristof’s columns [was] that the FBI should investigate Hatfill
more vigorously because all of the evidence (known to Kristof)
pointed to him,” and that a reasonable reader of the columns
would likely conclude that Dr. Hatfill was, in fact, the anthrax
killer. 105 The court reinstated Count II as well, finding that the
district court erred in concluding both that the claim was timebarred and that the “discrete false statements” were
independently incapable of defamatory meaning. 106
The analysis of Count III began by rejecting as too
broad the district court’s assertion that “[p]ublishing news or
commentary on matters of public concern” can never be
sufficiently extreme or outrageous to satisfy the elements of
IIED. 107 Reiterating its conclusion that Kristof’s columns are
reasonably read as accusing Dr. Hatfill of being responsible for
the anthrax attacks, the court found that such an accusation
could constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. 108
Specifically, if as Dr. Hatfill alleged, the Times intentionally
published a false accusation of murder without regard for its
veracity and without allowing for response, extreme and
outrageous conduct could be found. 109 Particularly important to
the court’s determination was “the notoriety of the case, the
charge of murder, and the refusal” of the Times to permit Dr.
Hatfill’s lawyer an opportunity to respond. 110
104
Id. at 330-34 (citing Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 82 S.E.2d 588,
591 (Va. 1954)).
105
Id. at 333.
106
Id. at 334-35. The court also rejected the district court’s conclusion that
the statute of limitations barred Count II. Id.
107
Id. at 336.
108
Hatfill, 416 F.3d at 336.
109
Id.
110
Id. The court’s treatment of the effects of “notoriety” poses an interesting
First Amendment dilemma. Considering that the constitutional protections afforded
the press are at their apex when commenting on matters of public concern, see Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (“It is speech
on matters of public concern that is at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.”
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (internal
quotation marks omitted))), courts often privilege such activity, see Robert E. Dreschel,
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Tort Liability for Mass Media, 89
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The court went on to discount the Times’ and the
district court’s contentions that allowing the IIED claim to
proceed would allow Dr. Hatfill to evade constitutional
limitations on defamation actions. The court reasoned that if
Dr. Hatfill was unable to meet the constitutional requirements
for recovery on his defamation claim, he would likely also be
unable to recover for IIED. 111 However, no mention was made
as to what the basis seemingly was for the district court’s
concern, namely that the Times would be twice punished for a
single act of publication. 112 Instead the court saw their sole
duty as determining whether Dr. Hatfill’s complaint alleged
intentional and outrageous misconduct. 113
The court also found that Dr. Hatfill sufficiently pled
severe emotional distress because the complaint alleged that
the columns caused him to “suffer[] severe and ongoing loss of
reputation and professional standing, loss of employment, past
and ongoing financial injury, severe emotional distress and
other injury,” as well as “grievous emotional distress.” 114 Like
the district court, the Fourth Circuit’s treatment of the severity
of harm element of IIED was typical, in that it was
overshadowed
and
seemingly
determined
by
the
outrageousness analysis.
Sufficiently outrageous conduct
DICK. L. REV. 339, 349 (1985) (“[C]ourts have indicated their sensitivity to
constitutional interests by noting that intentional infliction claims may interfere with
the media’s privilege to publish news in the public interest.” (citing Tumminello v.
Bergen Evening Record, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1156 (D.N.J. 1978))); Cape Pub’ns v.
Bridges, 423 So.2d 426, 428 (Fla. App. 1982); Costlow v. Cusimano, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92,
95-96 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); see also Dougherty v. Capital Cities Commc’ns, Inc., 631 F.
Supp. 1566, 1570 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit has expressly held that under
Michigan law, [the press] ha[s] a qualified privilege to report on matters of public
interest.” (internal citations, quotations, and quotation marks omitted)), or at least
consider it a powerful counterweight to allegations of outrageous or offensive conduct,
see Markin, supra note 90, at 487 (surveying cases where media defendants were sued
for IIED in the 1990’s and finding that “[i]n about one-eighth of the cases, courts cited
First Amendment concerns and generally ruled that the act of publishing the news,
however shocking the report might be, does not constitute outrageous behavior”).
Thus, the court’s determination that the anthrax attacks’ “notoriety” helped render the
Times’ coverage of those attacks tortious seems to run against an important theme of
First Amendment doctrine. Yet, undeniably, someone falsely accused of a notorious
murder will be more outraged than someone falsely accused of petty theft, despite, or
perhaps because of the fact that the latter crime is of far less public consequence. This
conflict demonstrates one of the difficulties of relying on an outrageousness standard to
determine when otherwise protected speech should subject the speaker to liability.
Other difficulties created by the outrageousness standard are discussed further in
Parts IV and V.
111
Hatfill, 416 F.3d at 336-37.
112
See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
113
Hatfill, 416 F.3d at 337.
114
Id.
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generally leads courts to presume sufficiently severe harm. 115
The court reversed the district court on each of Dr. Hatfill’s
claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. 116 In a
brief one page dissent that relied largely on the reasoning of
the district court, Judge Paul Niemeyer stated that the claims
should be dismissed because he found “nothing in the letter or
spirit of the columns” amounting to an accusation. 117
C.

Denial of Rehearing En Banc

After the Fourth Circuit’s reversal, two out of the four
judges who heard the case had voted to dismiss Dr. Hatfill’s
claims against the Times, yet all three counts of the complaint
survived the 12(b)(6) motion. Hoping they would be able to tip
the balance in their favor, the Times petitioned the full Fourth
Circuit for a rehearing en banc. 118 Of the twelve judges
weighing in on whether to grant the rehearing, only six voted
in favor of doing so. 119 Falling just short of producing the
majority necessary to grant rehearing, the decision of the
three-judge panel remained intact, as did Dr. Hatfill’s claims. 120
However, the views of the Times, and those of the press
generally, did enjoy some measure of validation from the panel.
In a rare move, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, a former
newspaper editorial page editor, issued a scathing ten page
dissent from the denial of rehearing. 121 The opinion, which
sounded in clear First Amendment tones, began by stating:
The panel’s decision in this case will restrict speech on a matter of
vital public concern. The columns at issue urged government action
on a question of grave national import and life-or-death
consequence. . . . It is worth remembering the context in which the
columns at issue were published. In the aftermath of the September
11 attacks, the nation was alerted to the fact that someone was
115

See supra note 87.
Hatfill, 416 F.3d at 337.
117
Id. at 337-38 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
118
Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 427 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 1619 (2006).
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Reporter’s Comm. for the Freedom of the Press, Divided Appeals Court
Won’t Review Libel Suit Decision, Oct. 19, 2005, http://www.rcfp.org/news/2005/
1019-lib-divide.html. Judge Wilkinson wrote another memorable dissent from a denial
of rehearing involving an IIED claim brought under Virginia law against a media
defendant. Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1986) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
His views in that opinion eventually found favor with a unanimous Supreme Court.
See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
116
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sending letters laced with anthrax through the mails. The letters
were not simply directed at public officials but apparently at private
individuals as well. Those who handled mail on a regular basis were
concerned for their safety, and even ordinary residents were advised
to take special precautions when opening their mail. At least five
people died from anthrax exposure. There was, in addition, worry
that law enforcement was ineffectual in locating the source of the
anthrax production and distribution. In other words, both the
problem and the steps necessary to resolve it were matters of public,
indeed national, concern. 122

Judge Wilkinson clearly felt Dr. Hatfill’s complaint should have
been dismissed and he went on to explain the threats posed by
allowing these types of meritless claims to survive early
dismissals. Acknowledging that the Times likely possessed the
resources to defend its interests in lengthy court battles, Judge
Wilkinson worried that many other smaller daily and weekly
newspapers within the Fourth Circuit did not: “[t]he prospect
of legal bills, court appearances, and settlement conferences
means that all but the most fearless will pull their punches
even where robust comment might check the worst impulses of
Judge
government and serve the community well.” 123
Wilkinson’s concern was justified, as historically, plaintiffs
have sued smaller news outlets quite frequently, despite their
presumably shallow pockets. 124
Regarding the IIED claim, Judge Wilkinson was “quite
at a loss” to see how publishing Kristof’s columns was utterly
intolerable in a civilized community, since they reported on
“matters of unquestioned public interest with urgent national
security implications.” 125 According to Wilkinson, “[t]he First
Amendment expressly specifies that the ‘civilized community’
in which we live is one that encourages public commentary of
this type.” 126 The dissent went on to explain how the anthrax
attacks and the government’s responses to them were “at the
heart of a legitimate public inquiry” and how the Times, by
publishing critical, albeit hard-hitting, columns regarding this
inquiry was merely doing its job, “a job that the Constitution
protects,” and that it was inappropriate for a federal court to
122

Hatfill, 427 F.3d at 253-54 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 255.
124
See, e.g., Markin, supra note 90, at 501 (“One might anticipate that most
[of the IIED] cases [from the 1990’s] stemmed from the acts of the stereotypic
aggressive network television news reporter. Such was not the case. More than half
involved newspapers, some of them quite small.”).
125
Hatfill, 427 F.3d at 258 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
126
Id.
123
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“construe gray areas of Virginia law to punish [that job] and
deter others from performing it.” 127
Judge Wilkinson’s eloquent dissent, while no doubt
appreciated by the Times, did not prevent their 12(b)(6) motion
from ultimately failing and their case from being remanded
back to the district court. 128 While the Times may eventually
prevail in its case, the decision of the Fourth Circuit remains.
What precedential value it acquires remains to be seen, but as
noted by Judge Wilkinson, the court’s readiness to accept that
commentary “on a subject of unquestioned public interest”
could support a claim for IIED constitutes a marked departure
from the overwhelming trend of case law. 129
IV.

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

A detailed discussion of the development and
implications of the tort of IIED is beyond the scope of this Note,
and has already been ably undertaken in a number of works
committed solely to that endeavor. 130 Nevertheless, a brief
history helps lay the foundation for what is this Note’s focus,
namely, application of the tort against the media pursuant to
their coverage of matters of public concern. The goal of this
section is to demonstrate that IIED is an extraordinarily vague
and undeveloped tort. Given the tort’s ambiguity, and the First
Amendment’s need for clear principles by which to adjudicate
disputes regarding protected speech, this section argues that
this area of the law needs greater clarity. While the Supreme
Court offered some clarification in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
many questions remain unanswered.
A.

The Rise of the Tort of Outrage

The general recognition of IIED as an independent
cause of action, sometimes referred to as “prima facie tort” or
“outrage,” is a relatively recent development in the law. 131
127

Id. at 258-59.
The Supreme Court denied the Times’ petition for a writ of certiorari. 126
S. Ct. 1619 (2006).
129
Hatfill, 427 F.3d at 258 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
130
See, e.g., Givelber, supra note 87; Calvert Magruder, Mental and
Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); William
Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874
(1939).
131
The English case of Wilkinson v. Downton is generally credited as the first
time that a court allowed recovery for emotional distress independently of an
128
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Legal scholarship, more than court action, spurred this
development. 132 It was a 1936 article written by Professor
Calvin Magruder in the Harvard Law Review that first noted
that courts had “in an ad hoc manner, and perhaps not very
scientifically . . . in large measure afforded legal redress for
mental or emotional distress in the more outrageous cases,
without formulating too broad a general principle.” 133
Magruder saw this judicial recognition as a preliminary stage
in the evolution toward accepting the idea that:
[O]ne who, without just cause or excuse, and beyond all the bounds
of decency, purposely causes a disturbance of another’s mental and
emotional tranquility of so acute a nature that harmful physical
consequences might be not unlikely to result, is subject to liability in
damages for such mental and emotional disturbance even though no
demonstrable physical consequences actually ensue. 134

Shortly after the Magruder article, Professor William Prosser
wrote that “[i]t is time to recognize that the courts have created
established cause of action. 2 Q.B. 57 (1897). The court in that case, attempting to
achieve a just result in the absence of precedent, awarded damages to a woman who
suffered permanent physical harm as a result of an ill conceived prank, in which the
defendant erroneously informed her that her husband had broken both his legs in a
horrible accident. Id. at 58-61; see also WILLIAM K. JONES, INSULT TO INJURY: LIBEL,
SLANDER, AND INVASIONS OF PRIVACY 19 (2003). In the following decades, recovery for
emotional distress was occasionally allowed in other circumstances, but only when, like
Mrs. Wilkinson, such distress was embodied by actual physical harm. See Magruder,
supra note 130, at 1045-48 (surveying and discussing some of the more colorful early
cases). The prevailing view regarding recovery of purely emotional damages was aptly
summarized by Lord Wensleydale in a frequently repeated passage from Lynch v.
Knight: “Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress,
when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone.” See id. at 1033 (citing Lynch
v. Knight, Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861)). Yet, compensation for emotional distress
unaccompanied by physical pain was allowed, if pled “parasitically” as an element of
damages of another established cause of action. See id. at 1049 (The original
Restatement provided that “emotional distress caused by the . . . tortious conduct which
is the cause thereof is taken into account in assessing the damages recoverable by the
other.” (citing RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, TORTS § 47(b) (1934))); see also Terrance C.
Mead, Suing Media for Emotional Distress: A Multi-Method Analysis of Tort Law
Evolution, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 24, 28 & n.20 (1983) (listing authorities). However, this
situation would not endure the test of time and reason, for as astute legal scholars of
the day correctly observed, “[t]he treatment of any element of damage as a parasitic
factor belongs essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A factor which is today recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, to-morrow be recognized as an independent
basis of liability.” See Magruder, supra note 130, at 1049 (quoting 1 STREET, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906)). Despite the fact that all jurisdictions
now appear to technically recognize IIED as an independent tort, 2 ROBERT D. SACK,
SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS §13.6, at 13-45 (3d ed.
2005), many continue, in practice, to treat the tort parasitically, see supra text
accompanying notes 96-98.
132
Givelber, supra note 87, at 42.
133
Magruder, supra note 130, at 1035.
134
Id. at 1058.
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a new tort.
It appears . . . in more than a hundred
decisions . . . It is something very like assault. It consists of the
intentional, outrageous infliction of mental suffering in an
extreme form.” 135 While acknowledging that attempting to
ascertain the ultimate limits of this evolving tort was
doubtlessly a “matter of conjecture,” Prosser observed that
when courts find liability in this area, it is because the
defendant has intentionally sought to inflict emotional distress
on a particularly vulnerable plaintiff. 136
Some years after Professor Magruder’s first tentative
definition of the principle behind compensating emotional
distress, the American Law Institute, in its Restatements,
developed what is now the commonly accepted articulation of
the tort of IIED: “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to
another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if
bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
harm.” 137 IIED is now universally recognized as a cause of
action by the states, and virtually all jurisdictions follow the
Restatement’s four element formulation. 138

135

Prosser, supra note 130, at 874.
Id. at 888. In the early cases, successful plaintiffs were almost universally
women, in part because of the then prevailing view that “[t]here is a difference between
violent and vile profanity addressed to a lady, and the same language to a Butte miner
and a United States marine.” Id. at 887. However, the noble protection of a lady’s
sensibilities only extended so far, as the courts had proved unwilling “to compensate
the silly, hysterical fright of a woman at the approach of a man dressed up in feminine
clothing.” Id. at 888 (citing Nelson v. Crawford, 81 N.W. 335 (Mich. 1899)).
Furthermore, claims seeking “damages for mental distress and humiliation on account
of being addressed by a proposal of illicit intercourse” were also denied, “the view
being, apparently, that there is no harm in asking.” Magruder, supra note 130, at
1055. However, at the time “it [was] not altogether certain how long the chivalry of the
southern courts [could] stand the strain” of allowing such propositions to go
unpunished. Prosser, supra note 130, at 889.
137
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965); Givelber, supra note 87,
at 42. The Institute first acknowledged the cause of action in its 1948 supplement to
the original Restatement, which provided that “[o]ne who, without a privilege to do so,
intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable (a) for such
emotional distress, and (b) for bodily harm resulting from it.” Id. at 43 & n.7 (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, SUPPLEMENT, TORTS § 46 (1948)).
138
These four elements are: (1) extreme or outrageous conduct, (2) conduct
was intentional or reckless, (3) conduct caused emotional distress, (4) the emotional
distress was severe. SACK, supra note 131, at § 13.6. Rhode Island imposes the
additional requirement that the conduct in question have caused some form of physical
harm as well. See Clift v. Narragansett Television, L.P., 688 A.3d 805, 813 (R.I. 1996).
For a comprehensive list of decisions recognizing the tort in various jurisdictions see
SACK, supra note 131, at § 13.6 at 13-45; Markin, supra note 90, at 472 n.17.
136
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As was the case in Hatfill, the question often centers
around outrageousness, 139 and whether “the conduct [was] so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” 140
In a passage aptly characterized as a “strange description of a
rule of law,” 141 the Restatement explains that “[g]enerally, the
case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average
member of the community would arouse his resentment
against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’” 142
As a general matter, this passage is troubling because it
appears to hinge civil liability on the “passion and prejudice of
the moment,” thus frustrating a central goal of due process. 143
Using the outrageousness standard to judge speech further
compounds the problem, given the First Amendment’s doctrinal
“hostility to overbreadth and vagueness,” and its requirement
that courts “look beyond the case at hand to the effects that
liability might have on other speakers.” 144 Supreme Court
jurisprudence makes clear the constitutional dilemmas
provoked when unclear rules of state law restrict First
Amendment freedoms. 145
This definitional vagueness combines with a general
lack of judicially created limitations to make IIED potentially
applicable in an extraordinarily broad range of settings. As
Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals
139

See supra note 87.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
141
Givelber, supra note 87, at 52.
142
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
143
Givelber, supra note 87, at 52.
144
David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK.
L. REV. 755, 771 (2004). See also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)
(“‘Outrageousness’ in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent
subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the
jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular
expression.”).
145
See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinatti, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971). In Coates,
the Court held that a city ordinance was “unconstitutionally vague because it subjects
the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable standard, and
unconstitutionally broad because it authorizes the punishment of constitutionally
protected conduct.” Id. The Court continued, “[c]onduct that annoys some people does
not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is vague . . . in the sense that no standard of
conduct is specified at all. As a result, ‘men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning.’” Id. (citing Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926)).
IIED’s outrageousness standard seems equally vague, as the activity
prohibited is “outrageous conduct [which the Restatement explains] is conduct that is
outrageous.” See Givelber, supra note 87, at 53.
140
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observed, “[t]he tort is as limitless as the human capacity for
cruelty.” 146 However, protecting emotional tranquility must at
times give way, when doing so would abridge another’s
constitutional rights. 147 This situation can and frequently does
arise when the otherwise-protected speech of one citizen
disturbs the emotional tranquility of another. 148 Given its wide
dissemination and often controversial nature, the speech in
such situations frequently belongs to members of the media. 149
The following sections discuss the interplay between tort law
and the First Amendment when plaintiffs sue members of the
media for IIED.
B.

Outrageous Acts of the Media

Suits for IIED against media defendants, much to their
dismay, have steadily increased in the past three decades. In
1985, Professor Robert E. Dreschel identified thirty-five cases
in which plaintiffs alleged IIED as an independent cause of
action against the media, and noted that all but six had been
brought since 1978. 150 Terrance C. Mead conducted a survey of
cases reported in the Media Law Reporter between the years
1977 and 1981, and found eighteen involving claims of IIED. 151
In 2000, using the same methodology, Dr. Karen Markin found
ninety-four such cases reported between 1990 and 1999. 152
Between 2000 and 2004 alone, the Media Law Reporter tells us
that plaintiffs brought claims of IIED against media
defendants at least fifty-nine times. 153 Because of the tort’s
146
Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 122 (1993). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (2006) (“The law is still in a stage of
development, and the ultimate limits of this tort are not yet determined.”).
147
See generally Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Richard D.
Bernstein, Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Words Intended to Inflict
Severe Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (1985).
148
See infra Part IV.B.
149
Id.
150
Robert E. Dreschel, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Tort
Liability for Mass Media, 89 DICK. L. REV. 339, 346 (1984-1985).
151
Mead, supra note 131, at 32-33 & n.52.
152
Markin, supra note 90, at 478.
153
Botts v. New York Times Co., 106 F. App’x 109 (3d Cir. 2004); Hussain v.
Palmer Commc’ns, Inc., 60 F. App’x 747 (10th Cir. 2003); Yohe v. Nugent, 321 F.3d 35
(1st Cir. 2003); Riley v. Harr, 292 F.3d 282 (1st Cir. 2002); Worrell-Payne v. Gannett
Co., 49 F. App’x. 105 (9th Cir. 2002); Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 267 F.3d 457 (6th
Cir. 2001); Zeran v. Diamond Broad., 203 F.3d 714 (10th Cir. 2000); Lynch v. Omaha
World-Herald Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 896 (D. Neb. 2004); Harris v. Seattle, 315 F. Supp.
2d 1105 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1129 (E.D. Va. 2004), rev’d, 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1619
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indeterminate scope, the increase in IIED suits justifiably
creates worry amongst the press, who necessarily report on
highly disturbing and controversial matters. 154
The cases in which members of the media have been
sued for IIED can roughly be divided into two categories—those
in which the allegedly outrageous conduct stemmed from
actions taken in gathering, or in some instances, making the
news, and those cases in which the allegedly outrageous
(2006); Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2004), aff’d, Amrak Prods.,
Inc. v. Morton, 410 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2005); Marks v. Seattle, 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1949 (W.D. Wash. 2003); Garrett v. Viacom, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2433 (N.D.W. Va.,
2003); Gales v. CBS Broad., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d 772 (S.D. Miss. 2003), aff’d, 124 F.
App’x 275 (5th Cir. 2005); Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 31 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2601 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Collier v. Murphy, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2159 (N.D. Ill.
2003); Campoverde v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1361 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); Daly v. Viacom, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Isbrigg v. Cosmos Broad.
Corp., 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1331 (S.D. Ind. 2002); A.M.P. v. Hubbard Broad., Inc.,
216 F. Supp. 2d 933 (D. Minn. 2001); Miracle v. New Yorker Magazine, 190 F. Supp. 2d
1192 (D. Haw. 2001); Ferris v. Larry Flynt Publ’g, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1833
(D. Haw. 2001); Stanley v. Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 701 (W.D. Ark.
2001); Idema v. Eager, 120 F. Supp. 2d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Van Buskirk v. New York
Times Co., 28 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2525 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Mineer v. Williams, 82 F.
Supp. 2d 702 (E.D. Ky. 2000); Long v. Walt Disney Co., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 836 (Cal Ct.
App. 2004); Laird v. Spelling, 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1085 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001);
Walker v. Kiousis, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Wiley v. AIDS Healthcare
Found., Inc., 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1307 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2004); Clawson v. Saint
Louis Post-Dispatch L.L.C., 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2608 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2004); Smith
v. Kranert, 28 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2375 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000); Lewis v. Sunbeam
Television, 28 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2214 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000); Collins v. Creative
Loafing Savannah, 592 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. App. 2003); Nix v. Cox Enters., Inc., 545 S.E.2d
319 (Ga. App. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 560 S.E.2d 650 (Ga. 2002); Bahktiernejad
v. Cox Enters., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Crawl v. Cox Enters., Inc., 29
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1826 (Ga. State Ct. 2001); Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 61 P.3d
606 (Idaho 2002); Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1961
(Idaho 2001), superceded on reh’g by 67 P.3d 29 (Idaho 2003); Tuite v. Corbitt, 830
N.E.2d 779 (Ill. App. 2005); Delaney v. Int’l Union UAW Local No. 94, 675 N.W.2d 832
(Iowa 2004); Lane v. Mem’l Press, Inc., 11 Mass L. Rptr. 468 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000);
Mitchell v. Baltimore Sun Co., 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1819 (Md. Cir. Ct. 2004), rev’d
on other grounds, 883 A.2d 1008 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 2005); March Funeral Homes West,
Inc. v. WJZ-TV Channel 13, Media L. Rep. 2207 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 2003); Collins v.
Detroit Free Press, Inc., 627 N.W.2d 5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); Shriner v. Flint Journal,
29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1525 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 2000); Craver v. Povitch, 32 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2385 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Bement v. N.Y.P. Holdings, Inc., 307 A.D.2d 86
(N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Garns v. Lonsberry, 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1907 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2003); Mayhew v. Imus, 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1061 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001); Gelbman v.
Valleycrest Prod., Ltd., 732 N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001); Irvine v. Akron Beacon
Journal, 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2008 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); Conese v. Hamilton
Journal-News, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2499 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Dominick v.
Index Journal, 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2329 (S.C. Cir. Ct. 2001); Piper v. Mize, 31
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Dolcefino v. Randolph, 30 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1161 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); Cox Texas Newspapers v. Wootten, 59 S.W.3d
717 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); Provencio v. Paradigm Media, Inc., 44 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2001); Doe v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 43 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); Davis v.
Star-Telegram Operating, Ltd., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1755 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
154
Markin, supra note 90, at 473; Dreschel, supra note 150, at 361.
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conduct was the publication or the broadcast itself. 155 Often
times these categories overlap, most typically when a journalist
acts in a dubious manner while obtaining material that is later
published. 156 However, when courts find outrageous conduct in
such situations it is generally based on the conduct of the
journalists in obtaining the news, rather than the content of
the news itself. 157 This is largely because the First Amendment
offers much less protection for the media when they are
pursuing the news than it does when they are disseminating
it. 158 The press have “no special immunity from the application
of general laws[, nor any] special privilege to invade the rights
and liberties of others.” 159 While the Supreme Court offered
some protection to newsgathering by upholding the right of the
press to publish information culled from public records and
proceedings, 160 “the First Amendment has never been construed
to accord a newsman immunity from torts or crimes committed”
while in pursuit of a story. 161
Constitutional concerns assume a much more prominent
role when media defendants are sued for IIED based on the
155

See generally Markin, supra note 90, at 479-91 (dividing IIED claims
brought against media defendants into those based on newsgathering activity and
those based on the content of the publication or broadcast).
156
See Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997)
(television journalists accompanied police to suicide scene, entered house while family
was forced to wait outside and obtained footage of dead woman that was later
broadcast on evening news); Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) (news crew accompanied paramedics into plaintiff’s house and filmed her dying
husband and broadcast footage without plaintiff’s consent); Green v. Chicago Tribune
Co., 675 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (newspaper journalists photographed plaintiff’s
dying son and recorded plaintiff’s last words to him, then published photo and last
words without plaintiff’s consent); Howell v. New York Post Co., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 115,
122 (1993) (photographer trespassed on to psychiatric hospital’s property to obtain
photograph, later published, of plaintiff walking with famous crime victim); Dolcefino
v. Randolph, 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1161 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (reporter used hidden
video camera to record segment that was later aired of city controller and staff member
wasting city funds by not working on a work day).
157
Barrett, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 747; Miller, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 682; Green, 675
N.E.2d at 257. See also KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr.2d 431, 435
(Cal. Ct. of App. 1995) (although footage was never broadcast, reporter’s conduct of
approaching young children in their home and informing them that their neighbor had
murdered her two children and committed suicide and then filming their reaction could
reasonably be understood by jury as outrageous enough to support claim of IIED).
158
Markin, supra note 90, at 479 (citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1
(1978); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972)).
159
Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (quoting Associated Press
v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)).
160
See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
161
Miller, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 685 (quoting Dietmann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d
245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971)).
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content of their publications. 162 Successful suits against the
media in these situations are rare, 163 especially when the
subject matter in question rises above the level of mere
ridicule. 164 However, these suits, often pled side by side with
actions for defamation and invasion of privacy, by far
constitute the majority of IIED claims brought against the
While the content of a disputed publication or
press. 165
broadcast is rarely adjudged outrageous, media defendants
must nevertheless endure the costs and distractions of these
increasingly common lawsuits, defending against claims
overwhelmingly proven to be without merit. 166 The burden of
162

See Markin, supra note 90, at 491-92.
SACK, supra note 131, § 13.6, 13-50 to 13-51.
164
See Esposito-Hilder v. SFX Broad., Inc., 236 A.D.2d 186 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997) (radio show hosts held contest where plaintiff was named “ugliest bride”);
Murray v. Schlosser, 574 A.2d 1339 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1990) (plaintiff, also a new bride,
was declared “dog of the week” by DJs and won prize of dog food and collar); Kolegas v.
Heftel Broad. Corp. (radio show hosts derided plaintiff for marrying wife that had
“Elephant Man” disease, despite fact that plaintiff paid station to promote festival
being held to raise awareness of the disease).
165
Of the fifty-nine reported cases between 2000 and 2004, supra note 153,
only eleven were based on something other than content: Lynch v. Omaha WorldHerald Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 896 (D. Neb. 2004) (plaintiff who “hacked” into defendant
newspaper’s website claimed that defendant destroyed evidence and acted fraudulently
in order to obtain criminal conviction against him); Campoverde v. Sony Pictures
Entm’t, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (lawyer involved in highly
publicized adoption proceeding appeared on “The Ricki Lake Show” and claimed that
he was coerced into signing new contract); Walker v. Kiousis, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 69 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2001) (citizen arrested for drunken driving filed allegedly false complaint
claiming that arresting officer acted improperly); Lewis v. Sunbeam Television, Inc., 28
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2214 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000) (television station broadcast intercepted
conversation in which police officer brags to friend about beating up her cheating
boyfriend); Mitchell v. Baltimore Sun Co., 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1819 (Md. Cir. Ct.
2004) (reporters visited former Congressman in nursing home and refused to leave),
rev’d on other grounds, 883 A.2d 1008 (Md. Ct. Sp. App.); Shriner v. Flint Journal, 29
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1525-26 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 2000) (reporter sued newspaper over
statements made in the newsroom regarding the termination of reporter’s
employment); Craver v. Povitch, 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2385 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
(minor sued “The Maury Povitch Show” after show introduced her to man that
allegedly raped her); Gelbman v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 732 N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2001) (contestant eliminated from “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?” claimed that
he was asked unfair question with multiple correct answers); Piper v. Mize, 31 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (defendant allowed allegedly defamatory
underground newspaper to be placed with free periodicals at his place of business);
Dolcefino v. Randolph, 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1161 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (reporter
used hidden video camera to record city controller and staff member waste city funds
by not working on a work day); Provencio v. Paradigm Media, Inc, 44 S.W.3d 677 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2001) (media outlet sent postcards falsely claiming to be from the “Texas
Department of Public Safety” to plaintiff sex offender’s trailer park seeking address
verification).
166
Of the cases surveyed, supra note 153, no final judgments were reported
where plaintiffs prevailed on a content-based IIED claim, however, there were several
plaintiff “victories” where such claims survived dismissal and summary judgment
163
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defending these suits is heightened by the vague and
unprincipled standards by which IIED claims are typically
evaluated. 167 The lack of clear standards evidences the
Restatement’s concession that the tort of IIED is “still in a stage
This immaturity becomes especially
of development.” 168
apparent when the tort is applied against speech alongside the
ancient tort of defamation. Defamation, unlike IIED, is not
only clearly articulated as a matter of tort law, but also has
had its constitutional ramifications carefully examined, albeit
with somewhat complicated results. 169 Despite the complex
constitutional guidelines associated with defamation, would-be
speakers still know the standards by which their speech will be
judged and thus the fear of self-censorship is thought to be
alleviated. 170 The same can not be said for IIED.
C.

Preachers, Porn & Public Discourse: The Implications of
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell

The constitutional considerations associated with
defamation actions have, however, to a certain extent
influenced courts’ resolution of IIED claims. This influence
achieved its most famous expression by the Supreme Court in
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell. 171 The dispute giving rise to that

motions. Marks v. City of Seattle, 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1949 (W.D. Wash. 2003)
(false light based IIED claim survived 12(b)(6) motion where video broadcast of city
official’s assistant portrayed her as using city-paid rental car for personal use);
Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2601 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(claim survived 12(b)(6) motion because defendant’s bare assertion that the First
Amendment provides a defense, while possibly accurate, does not address whether
plaintiff stated a legally cognizable claim); Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 29 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1961, 1970 (Idaho 2001) (summary judgment on IIED claim reversed
because based on meritless constitutional and fair report privileges), superceded on
reh’g, 67 P.3d 29, 35-36 (summary judgment reinstated because “[c]hanging the cause
of action from invasion of privacy to infliction of emotional distress does not circumvent
the constitutional protection of the publication”);The Fourth Circuit’s decision in
Hatfill v. New York Times Co. is of course another example of an IIED claim surviving
a motion for early dismissal. 416 F.3d 320, 337 (2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1619
(2006). See supra note 10.
167
See supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
168
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (1965).
169
See Anderson, supra note 144, at 787-88 (listing cases and describing “the
phalanx of constitutional rules limiting defamation”).
170
See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 159 (1979) (explaining that the Court’s
defamation jurisprudence “rested primarily on the conviction that the common law of
libel gave insufficient protection to the First Amendment guarantees . . . and that to
avoid self-censorship it was essential that liability for damages be conditioned on the
specified showing of culpable conduct by those who publish damaging falsehood”).
171
485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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decision concerned a lewd ad parody of televangelist Reverend
Jerry Falwell published in the pages of Hustler, a pornographic
men’s magazine. 172 Falwell, an admitted public figure, sued
Hustler and its publisher, Larry Flynt, 173 for invasion of privacy
under Virginia statute, defamation, and IIED. 174 When the
case came before the Supreme Court on certiorari from the
Fourth Circuit, only the IIED claim was at issue. 175 The Court
unanimously ruled that the parody was not actionable and
found for Flynt and his magazine. 176
Observers see the Falwell decision primarily as the
Court’s clarification and reiteration of the “actual malice”
standard, and the reasons giving rise to that standard,
pronounced in New York Times v. Sullivan. 177 Rejecting the
Fourth Circuit’s focus on outrageousness and Flynt’s stated

172
Id. at 48. The parody contained a fictionalized interview where Falwell
described his “first time” as a “drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an
outhouse.” Id. For a detailed discussion of the decision and its implications, see Robert
C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601
(1990); Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of
Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 423 (1988). See also Catherine L. Amspacher &
Randal Steven Springer, Note, Humor, Defamation and Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress: The Potential Predicament for Private Figure Plaintiffs, 31 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 701 (1990) (expressing concern over the ability of private figure plaintiffs
to protect their emotional well being after Falwell).
173
For an interview with Larry Flynt regarding his First Amendment legacy,
see Clay Calvert & Robert Richards, Larry Flynt Uncensored: A Dialogue With the Most
Controversial Figure in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 9 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 159
(2001). For an interview with Flynt’s attorney, see Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards,
Alan Isaacman and the First Amendment: A Candid Interview with Larry Flynt’s
Attorney, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313 (2001).
174
Falwell, 485 U.S. at 47-48.
175
Id. at 48-49. The district court had dismissed the privacy claim, because
although the Hustler parody had used Falwell’s name and likeness, it had not done so
“for purposes of trade” within the meaning of the statute that Falwell sued under.
Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986), overruled, Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 45 (1988). The jury found for Flynt and Hustler on the defamation
claim, “finding that no reasonable man would believe that the parody was describing
actual facts about Falwell.” Id.
176
Falwell, 485 U.S. at 47, 57. Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision
and Justice White filed a brief concurring opinion. Id.
177
376 U.S. 254 (1964). See, e.g., Post, supra note 172, at 612; Smolla, supra
note 172, at 435 (describing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Falwell: “[I]n both
letter and spirit, he was reaffirming New York Times with relish.”). New York Times
held that a public official could not recover “damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964). Subsequent cases extended the actual malice requirement to defamation
claims brought by “public figures,” as opposed to just public officials. Curtis Publ’g Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker 389 U.S. 28 (1967).
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intent to “assassinate” Falwell’s integrity, 178 the Court held
that public figures and public officials could not recover for the
tort of IIED stemming from publications such as the Falwell
parody without additionally demonstrating that the publication
contains a false statement of fact made with “actual malice, i.e.,
with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless
Because the
disregard as to whether it was true.” 179
statements at issue were not reasonably capable of being
perceived as statements of fact, the Court reversed the jury
verdict against Hustler and Flynt. 180 Thus, the ultimate rule
emerging from Falwell, the only instance in which the Supreme
Court has attempted to reconcile the tort of IIED and the First
Amendment, is a narrow one, and has been criticized as
offering little guidance beyond the particular circumstances of
the case. 181 Nevertheless, the Court discussed the concept of
“outrageousness,” found it an inappropriate standard to
determine liability in the area of “political and social
discourse,” and ultimately rejected it as a guide for judging
speech about public persons. 182
The decisions of the lower courts over the past eighteen
years, whether mentioning Falwell or not, seem largely in
agreement that speech on matters of public concern should not
give rise to liability for IIED. Despite the multitude of IIED
claims challenging such speech during this period, successful
plaintiffs are conspicuously lacking. 183 The courts considering
these claims utilized a variety of approaches but generally
reached the same conclusion and found liability in such
situations inappropriate. Some courts found reporting on
newsworthy events simply unable to constitute outrageous
conduct; 184 others determined the plaintiff bringing the suit was
178
Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273, 1275 (4th Cir. 1986), overruled,
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
179
Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56. The court maintained that this holding was “not
merely a ‘blind application’ of the New York Times standard,” but rather reflected their
“considered judgment that such a standard is necessary to give adequate ‘breathing
space’ to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.” Id.
180
Id. at 57.
181
See Post, supra note 172, at 614-15 & n.66.
182
Falwell, 485 U.S. at 55.
183
See Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 427 F.3d at 253, 258 (4th Cir. 2005)
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“The panel offers no decision from Virginia or any other
state that holds a news report on a subject of unquestioned public interest to be an
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”).
184
Brown v. Hearst Corp., 54 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 1995) (news segment
implying plaintiff murdered his missing wife was not outrageous because segment
consisted of generally accurate coverage of a legitimate news story); Ross v. Burns, 612
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a public figure unable to prove actual malice; 185 while still
others found the conduct in question possibly outrageous, but
held the First Amendment nevertheless protected the
Many other courts considering
defendant from liability. 186
IIED claims failed to undertake any real substantive analysis
at all and instead merely reiterated the Restatement test before
concluding, without explanation, that the plaintiff failed to
meet it. 187
In some respects, the current situation parallels the
condition present when Professors Magruder and Prosser first
noted that the courts, without clearly articulating their
reasons, recognized that plaintiffs had an interest in their
emotional wellbeing independent from any other interest.
F.2d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1980) (publishing photos and identity of undercover police
officer with headline “Know Your Enemies” not outrageous—publishing photos taken
in public place in conjunction with “news story” cannot be “extreme and outrageous”);
Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1129, 1137 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(“[p]ublishing news or commentary on matters of public concern simply cannot be
deemed . . . outrageous”), rev’d, 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
1619 (2006); Dougherty v. Capitol Cities Commc’ns, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1566, 1576 (E.D.
Mich. 1986) (“reporting on . . . matters of legitimate public interest . . . without actual
malice . . . cannot be . . . extreme and outrageous”); Crawl v. Cox Enters., 29 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1826, 1830 (Ga. State Ct. 2001) (publishing witness’ name in connection
with noteworthy crime is not outrageous because it is accurate news account of event of
public concern). See also Van Buskirk v. New York Times Co., 28 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2525, 2528 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (writing a letter claiming plaintiff lied about committing
war crimes found not to be outrageous).
185
See, e.g., Worrell-Payne v. Gannett Co., 49 F. App’x. 105 (9th Cir. 2002);
Harris v. Seattle, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1111 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Isgrigg v. Cosmos
Broad. Corp., 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1331 (S.D. Ind. 2002); Steele v. SpokesmanReview, 61 P.3d 606, 610 (Idaho 2002); Garns v. Lonsberry, 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1907, 1909 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003); Conese v. Hamilton Journal-News, Inc., 29 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2499, 2502 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). See also Lane v. Mem’l Press, Inc., 11
Mass. L. Rptr. 468 (Super. Ct. 2000) (finding it unlikely that allegations concerning
public officials could ever be extreme and outrageous).
186
See, e.g., Citizen Publ’g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 110, 115 (Ariz. 2005)
(en banc) (conceding that letter to editor published in newspaper that called for readers
to randomly execute local Muslims in order to win war in Iraq was outrageous, but
finding it protected by the First Amendment as political speech).
187
The analysis of the Tenth Circuit in Hussain v. Palmer Commc’ns, Inc.
typifies this approach. 60 F. App’x 747 (10th Cir. 2003). In that case, plaintiff’s
digitally altered photo was aired on defendant’s news program and plaintiff was falsely
identified as being sought by authorities in connection with the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing. Id. at 748-49. After explaining the Restatement test, the court’s entire
substantive analysis of the IIED claim consisted of the following:
After careful review, we find nothing in the record which indicates that the
defendants behaved in such an extreme or outrageous manner towards
Hussain as to impose liability for [IIED]. There is no evidence in the record
to indicate that the plaintiff could prove that the defendants’ conduct
qualified under any of these standards.
Id. at 754.
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Likewise courts considering IIED claims, aware of the time
honored principle “that speech on public issues occupies the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and
is entitled to special protection,” 188 have found ways, “in an ad
hoc manner, and perhaps not very scientifically” 189 to protect
the media from liability for IIED when they are fulfilling their
constitutional role.
Despite this piecemeal recognition of a newsworthiness
defense, absent binding precedent in a given jurisdiction,
courts are under no obligation to shield speech on matters of
public concern from liability for IIED. The Fourth Circuit’s
decision in Hatfill evidences this. 190 Furthermore, the variety
of techniques being employed by the courts creates great
uncertainty as to how any given claim will be adjudicated.
Considering the widespread distribution of modern media
product, this creates a significant impediment to effectively
evaluating the potential liability of a given publication and can
lead to self-censorship, a central fear of First Amendment
doctrine. 191 “Having to evaluate the liability schemes of fifty
jurisdictions imposes a considerable burden on speech itself,
quite apart from the actual effects of those schemes.” 192 This
situation is in need of remedy, and “[a]lthough there is little
evidence that [IIED] will ever provide the basis for principled
adjudication” as a matter of tort law, the First Amendment is
capable of imposing requirements so that the principled
adjudication of claims against protected speech is possible. 193
Such constitutional requirements appear most clearly in the

188
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759
(1985) (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
189
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
190
A district court already relied upon this decision as grounds for refusing to
dismiss an IIED claim, albeit in an almost factually identical case concerning a
separate article written about Dr. Hatfill in Vanity Fair. See Hatfill v. Foster, 401 F.
Supp. 2d 320, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 415 F. Supp. 2d 353
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
191
See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759
(1988) (identifying self censorship as a “major First Amendment risk[] associated with
unbridled licensing schemes”); Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, Inc., 475 U.S. 767,
789 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opining that the possibility of an erroneous
defamation verdict “would create a strong impetus toward self-censorship, which the
First Amendment cannot tolerate” (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29, 50 (1971) (Brennan, J., plurality)).
192
Anderson, supra note 144, at 794.
193
See Givelber, supra note 88, at 75.
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field of defamation law, 194 but Falwell demonstrates the
possibility that similar rules may be adopted and applied in
other areas of tort law as well.
V.

CONCLUSION

A.

Proposed Newsworthiness Defense

In Falwell, the Supreme Court questioned the
constitutionality of judging public discourse by an
outrageousness standard. 195 This inevitably casts doubt on
using the accepted formulation of IIED to judge public
discourse, as the Restatement’s four-element test, in practice,
generally reduces the analysis to the single element of
outrageousness. 196 In order to reconcile IIED with the First
Amendment, at least to the extent needed to decide Falwell,
the Court engrafted the actual malice standard onto the
Restatement test—thus assuring that the Court’s carefully
crafted protections regarding speech on public figures would
not be torn down by the emerging tort of IIED. 197
Consequently, one element of public discourse was granted
constitutional protection from emotional distress claims. The
First Amendment’s conception of public discourse, however,
encompasses more than simply speech about public figures, it
“embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly . . . all
matters of public concern.” 198 The facts giving rise to Hatfill
make clear the potential of important public matters to draw
ostensibly private figures into their vortex. 199 Yet, the current
legal framework leaves it to the lower courts to determine for
themselves how to treat these cases. 200 While it is rare indeed
that a court finds the content of a legitimate news story to be
outrageous, 201 the problem remains that outrageousness, with
all its inherent vagueness and subjectivity, still governs the

194

See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text. Commentators quickly
echoed this concern. See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 172, at 446 (“[N]othing could be more
antithetical to settled first amendment doctrine than the notion that speech may be
penalized merely for being ‘outrageous.’”).
196
See supra notes 87, 140-45 and accompanying text.
197
See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
198
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940).
199
See supra Part II.
200
See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
201
Id.
195
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analysis. 202 In order to protect the important constitutional
principles espoused in Falwell, courts considering IIED claims
based on the content of speech should recognize a
newsworthiness defense and dismiss plaintiffs’ claims when
they seek to punish speech on matters of legitimate public
concern.
The adoption of a newsworthiness defense to speechbased torts is by no means a novel idea; the common law
embraces such a defense with respect to the privacy tort of
public disclosure of private facts, 203 and the Supreme Court
seemingly accepted, then firmly rejected the defense as applied
to defamation claims—at least insofar as asserting the defense
required plaintiffs to prove actual malice, rather than mere
negligence. 204 Neither the common law nor the Court have
definitively spoken on such a defense for IIED claims; the
experience of the other speech torts, however, provides
valuable insight regarding both the applicability and the
constitutional necessity of such a defense in the IIED context.
The roots of the public disclosure tort’s newsworthiness
defense can be traced back as far as 1890, when Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote in their seminal article, The
Right to Privacy, that “[t]he right to privacy does not prohibit
any publication of matter which is of public or general
interest.” 205 The current formulation of the public disclosure
tort, as embodied in the Restatement, provides for liability
when a defendant publicizes private facts about a plaintiff that
“would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,” and are “not
of legitimate concern to the public.” 206 Judge Richard Posner
202

See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1965) (“One who gives
publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the
public.” (emphasis added)).
204
The Court, in a plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan, seemingly
extended the New York Times requirement—that a plaintiff prove actual malice—to
cases brought by private individuals where the allegedly defamatory speech related to
matters of public concern. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 402 U.S. 29, 52 (1971)
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion). This state of the law was short-lived, however, for
three years later, a majority of the Court rejected the proposed extension of the New
York Times test and held that the Constitution only required a private libel plaintiff to
prove that the defendant was negligent. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346
(1974).
205
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 214 (1890).
206
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1965) (emphasis added)
203
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explained that these two elements of the tort are largely
inseparable, as “[a]n individual, and more pertinently perhaps
the community, is most offended by the publication of intimate
personal facts when the community has no interest in them
beyond the voyeuristic thrill of penetrating the wall of privacy
Thus, one probably best
that surrounds a stranger.” 207
understands the concept of newsworthiness in this context as a
creature of tort law, mitigating the offensiveness of a given
disclosure.
While the First Amendment lurks in the
background whenever tort law seeks to punish speech—public
disclosure’s newsworthiness defense was conceived as one of
the tort’s inherent elements, rather than as an explicit
constitutional prohibition. 208
In contrast, the Supreme Court’s flirtation with a
newsworthiness defense to defamation claims was born wholly
of First Amendment concerns. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality, observed that the
constitutional conceptions of free speech and free press embody
more than simply the ability to comment upon the affairs of
public persons. 209 Brennan explained that the interest of the
public centers around public events and a plaintiff’s
participation in those events, not the plaintiff’s “prior
anonymity or notoriety.” 210 In order to “honor the [First
Amendment’s] commitment to robust debate on public issues,”
Brennan thought it necessary to extend constitutional
protection to all speech on matters of public concern, regardless
of whether the persons involved were public or private
figures. 211 Just three years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
however, a majority of the court rejected the Rosenbloom
plurality’s extension of the New York Times test. 212 Reasoning
that private persons were more vulnerable to reputational
207

Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993).
In explaining the rationale for the defense, Warren and Brandeis discussed
libel law and the notion of a qualified privilege to discuss matters of public concern,
specifically topics concerning public figures. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 205, at
214-16. While this concept became a canon of First Amendment doctrine in New York
Times v. Sullivan, at the time it was merely a concern of tort law. See 376 U.S. 254.
Warren and Brandeis’s focus on tort remedies rather than First Amendment
implications is further evidenced by the fact that they explained the importance of the
newsworthiness defense by looking to French law, not the Constitution. Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 205, at 214-16.
209
403 U.S. 29, 41 (1971) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
210
Id. at 43.
211
Id. at 41, 43-44.
212
418 U.S. 323, 346-47 (1974).
208
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injury and more deserving of recovery than public persons, the
Court found the extension unacceptable. 213 Justice Powell’s
majority opinion also expressed concern about forcing on the
lower courts the task of determining, on a case-by-case basis,
what publications concerned matters of legitimate public
interest. 214
At first blush, one might see Gertz as foreclosing the
possibility of a constitutionally based newsworthiness defense
for IIED claims. After all, Falwell was based on New York
Times 215 and Gertz declined to extend New York Times to
situations involving private persons. While this argument
contains a certain logical appeal, it leaves something important
out of the equation—namely, that defamation and IIED are
different torts. While they often apply to the same situation,
they seek to redress different wrongs, and thus require
plaintiffs to prove completely different elements. 216 The First
Amendment necessarily requires different things from each. 217
Falwell does not say otherwise, rather, the court explicitly
noted that its holding was not a “blind application of the New
York Times standard,” but rather reflected that such a
standard was needed in the IIED context to provide sufficient
The
“breathing space” to First Amendment freedoms. 218
problem left unresolved by Falwell and not answered by Gertz
is that, in IIED claims, publicly important speech involving
private persons is still judged by an extremely subjective
outrageousness standard. In the libel context, such speech
cannot be the basis for liability, unless a court at the very least
finds that defamatory statements were published with
negligence as to their veracity. 219 This is a factual finding
properly left to the jury. In the IIED context, however, liability
hinges on whether a given publication leads the jury, as
representatives of community sentiment, to exclaim

213

Id. at 345-46.
Id. at 346.
215
See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
216
See Smolla, supra note 172, at 439 (explaining why, because of the
differing objectives of the two torts, it was “logically indefensible” to mechanically and
literally apply New York Times to IIED claims).
217
See Smolla, supra note 172, at 438 (“moving from one tort context to
another changes not only the elements of the tort cause of action, but also the balance
of first amendment interests”).
218
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
219
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
214
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“Outrageous!” 220 This latter test clearly poses different First
Amendment problems than the former, thus, Gertz’s rejection
of a newsworthiness defense to defamation claims fails to
foreclose the possibility of adopting such a defense to IIED
claims.
In the context of speech, the elements of IIED parallel
those of the public disclosure tort to a far greater degree than
they do those of defamation. In order for speech to be a
tortious public disclosure, it must be “highly offensive to a
reasonable person,” 221 whereas in the IIED context tortious
speech consists of that which is “extreme and outrageous” as
determined by community sentiment. 222 Assuming that the
community’s sentiments are reasonable, it is difficult to
differentiate between these two standards in any sort of
principled manner. 223 Because of this, commentators have
noted the lack of any “logical reason” why a newsworthiness
defense should apply to one tort action but not the other. 224
While the newsworthiness defense to public disclosure claims
was conceived in tort law, 225 it suffices to protect defendants
from being punished for exercising their First Amendment
right to speak on public matters simply because one might find
their speech “highly offensive.” Such a defense is likewise
needed to prevent plaintiffs from using IIED claims to punish
the press, or any other speaker, simply because their speech on
public matters could be considered “outrageous” by some.
“[T]he world of debate about public affairs” 226 occupies a
preeminent role in our constitutional scheme. 227 In order to
adequately safeguard the right to freely engage in this debate,
220

See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
222
See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
223
See Dreschel, supra note 150, at 354 (“In fact, the proof requirements of the
two torts resemble each other rather closely.”). Although IIED technically requires
proof of severity of harm and intent to inflict emotional suffering, courts generally infer
these elements upon finding sufficiently outrageous conduct. See supra notes 87, 14045 and accompanying text.
224
Dreschel, supra note 150, at 355. The First Amendment aside, it seems
the newsworthiness defense to the public disclosure tort could easily become
meaningless if a plaintiff could circumvent it simply by recasting their action as a
claim for IIED. Id.
225
See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
226
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988).
227
See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“Those who won our independence believed . . . that public discussion is a
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government.”).
221
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courts considering IIED claims based on the content of speech
should allow defendants to assert a newsworthiness defense.
Where the contested speech unquestionably relates to a matter
of legitimate public concern, the IIED claim should be
dismissed. When a court “can determine from the pleadings a
case-dispositive First Amendment defense,” dismissal is
appropriate as it protects First Amendment rights and obviates
the need for an extended, costly, and ultimately futile trial. 228
Despite the concerns expressed by Justice Powell in Gertz, the
making of this determination seems well within the faculties of
the judiciary. 229 Courts have been undertaking this exact
inquiry in the context of the public disclosure tort for years. As
the Court in Falwell saw the need to borrow a principle of
defamation law to address the First Amendment threat
presented by a public figure’s IIED claim, so too should courts
today borrow a principle from the field of privacy law to
address the threat presented by the burgeoning numbers of
IIED claims being adjudicated under an unconstitutionally
vague standard. Adopting a newsworthiness defense is not
merely a “blind application” of a principle of privacy law; rather
it is necessary to prevent constitutionally protected expression
from being judged by an inherently subjective standard—thus
providing adequate “breathing space” for First Amendment
freedoms. 230
B.

Hatfill v. New York Times Revisited

In Hatfill, the newsworthiness of Kristof’s columns
placed no formal obligation on the Fourth Circuit to dismiss Dr.
Hatfill’s IIED claim. The public importance of Kristof’s subject
matter was only relevant insofar as it factored into the court’s
outrageousness analysis. While the district court believed that
publishing news or commentary on a matter of legitimate
concern could never be sufficiently outrageous, the Fourth
Circuit disagreed. 231 In holding that an op-ed piece on such an
undeniably important item of news could be outrageous, the
court single-handedly expanded the scope of IIED. 232 While a
228

See Citizen Publ’g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107 (Ariz. 2005).
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
230
See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
231
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
232
See Markin, supra note 90, at 488 (exhaustively surveying IIED claims
against media defendants in the 1990’s and opining that “[a]t most one can conclude
that the publication of editorial content, no matter how intrusive into a person’s
229
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false accusation of murder is no trivial matter, the law of
defamation is far better suited to remedy the harm caused by
injurious falsehood than is the law of IIED. 233 Application of a
newsworthiness defense to IIED claims would not deny remedy
to one falsely implicated in a crime, any more so than the
constitutional standards governing defamation already limit
Recognition of a
remedies in such situations. 234
newsworthiness defense would instead merely prevent an
unhappy subject of a legitimate news story from punishing
constitutionally favored speech by suing under a vague and
ambiguous cause of action. Recognition of a newsworthiness
defense would require courts dismiss IIED claims such as Dr.
Hatfill’s, and would add much needed clarity to this neglected
area of the law. Failure to adopt the defense, on the other
hand, licenses IIED’s continued encroachment into the world of
public discourse. The Supreme Court noted in New York Times
v. Sullivan that “[w]hatever is added to the field of libel is
taken from the field of free debate.” 235 When other torts seek to
punish speech, the effect of their expansion is no different.
Ben Battles †

private affairs, most likely will not be found outrageous as a matter of law, unless it
pointedly ridicules an individual or horrifies a bereaved family.”)
233
Injurious falsehood is, in fact, the harm libel law seeks to redress. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977) (“To create liability for defamation
there must be publication of a statement that is both defamatory and false.”).
234
See supra notes 169, 209-14 and accompanying text.
235
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (quoting
Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942)).
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